

SECRET

Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80T00294A000300010009-2

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

MFG. 1-72

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEM BY

PER #

TOTAL COPIES:

REPRO BY

FILE #

78
DDP, DDI, D/OC13, D/ONE, DDST2, D/OSR, D/FMSA,
C/OSIDS, D/CRS, SA/SAL,

NNNNVV EIA203LAM27
OO RUEAIIB
ZNR UUUUU ZOC STATE ZZH
OO RUFHST
DE RUEHC #0892 3412207
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
0062154Z DEC 72
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USDEL SALT TWO-I IMMEDIATE 2519
BT
UNCLAS STATE 220892

90268

LIMDIS SALT

FOR AMBASSADOR SMITH FROM CHRISTOPHER
FOLLOWING TEXT OF PROXIMITY LETTER TO AMBASSADOR SMITH
DATED DECEMBER 4, 1972 RELEASED BY PROXIMITY TO PRESS
TODAY TOGETHER WITH LEONARD'S ANSWER TO EARLIER PROXIMITY
LETTER ON SAME SUBJECT.
BEGIN TEXT.

DEAR MR. SMITH:

I HAVE RECEIVED THE RECENT LETTER FROM YOUR OFFICE
REGARDING MY SUGGESTION FOR PRELIMINARY ARMS CONTROL
DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. I
APPRECIATE YOUR TIMELY REPLY AND HAVE TAKEN NOTE OF
YOUR WILLINGNESS TO PROCEED DOWN THIS PATH. MAY I
COMMEND YOU AND YOUR AGENCY FOR HAVING THE FORESIGHT
TO ANTICIPATE THESE PROBLEMS AND THE FLEXIBILITY TO BE
RECEPTIVE TO APPROACHES BY THE PRC.

I WOULD URGE YOU, HOWEVER, TO BE MORE THAN RECEPTIVE.
CHINA HAS GONE THROUGH SUCH MASSIVE INTERNAL UPHEAVAL
AND WE KNOW SO LITTLE ABOUT THIS NUCLEAR POWER THAT IT
MAY REST WITH US TO MAKE THE INITIATIVES. AFTER ALL,
IF DONE CAREFULLY AND WITH PROPER CONSULTATION OF
ALLIES SUCH AS JAPAN, WHAT DO WE HAVE TO LOSE?

NEGOTIATIONS ARE NOT OFTEN CULMINATED WITHOUT THE MOST
PAINSTAKING ADVANCE PREPARATION, AS YOU KNOW MORE THAN

State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file

Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80T00294A000300010009-2

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80T00294A000300010009-2

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

MFG. 1-72

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEM BY

PER #

TOTAL COPIES:

REPRO BY

FILE RF.

#90268

Pg 32

ANYONE ELSE. THIS ARGUES THAT THE TIME TO BEGIN IS NOW, EVEN IF AT THE LOWEST LEVELS.

WHILE THE US HAS MADE SOME LIMITED INITIATIVES TOWARD THE PRC, A STRONGER STANCE MUST BE TAKEN. THE US SHOULD TAKE POSITIVE STEPS TO BRING ABOUT SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE CHINESE. IN LIEU OF ANY SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS IN YOUR PREVIOUS LETTER AND WITH RESPECT FOR YOUR OPINIONS, I OFFER THE FOLLOWING POSSIBILITIES:

1. CONSIDER RESPONDING TO THE CHINESE POLICY STATEMENTS OF "NO FIRST USE" OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY RECIPROCATING WITH A US POLICY OF "NO FIRST USE AGAINST CHINA" AS LONG AS NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAVE NOT BEEN USED BY ANY OTHER PARTIES.
2. THE US COULD MAKE AN INITIATIVE REGARDING A NUCLEAR FREE ZONE IN ASIA.
3. BEGIN BROAD MULTILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ABOUT CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL IN ASIA.
4. START INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH VISITING DELEGATIONS FROM THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

COULD YOU SUPPLY ME WITH ACD'S POSITION ON THESE POINTS?

SINCERELY,

WILLIAM PROXMIRE, U. S. S.

END TEXT.

MACOMBER

BT

#0892

Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80T00294A000300010009-2

SECRET